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ABSTRACT 
This article considers how the United Kingdom has shaped EU 
financial regulation. It suggests that the United Kingdom might best 
be described as the ‘grit in the oyster’ – an occasionally irritating 
presence, which has prompted the production of a harmonized 
regulatory system which, to a workable extent, serves the needs of the 
EU’s integrated financial system. It also speculates as to how EU 
financial regulation is likely to develop without the United Kingdom. 
It concludes that, while prediction is a fraught exercise, the European 
Union can be expected to bend ever more sharply towards uniformity 
with respect to regulatory governance for the single market. The 
United Kingdom is likely to leave a moderating legacy, however, in 
the form of an embedded institutional commitment to proportionality 
and to evidence-based regulatory design. It is more difficult to predict 
how the EU’s regulatory governance in relation to the international 
market is likely to evolve. Here, geo-politics and international trade 
relations are likely to be determinative. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 29, 2017, the United Kingdom, under Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union, notified the European Council of its 
intention to leave the European Union.1 On April 29th, negotiating 
guidelines were issued by European Council; these guidelines set the 
EU’s position for the negotiations, which are being led by the 
European Commission, through the chief EU negotiator, Michel 
Barnier.2 After months of speculation as to possible outcomes, the 
negotiation process, which started formally on June 19, 2017, is 
underway. The nature of the UK/EU settlement governing financial 
services (assuming one is agreed) can be expected to form a 
significant part of the discussions. The scale of the interdependencies 
between the EU and UK financial systems means that workable 
access arrangements are a concern to both parties, even if the distinct 
incentives and preferences of the European Union and United 
                                                                                                                                  
1.  See Letter from UK Prime Minister May to European Council President Tusk (Mar. 
29, 2017) [hereinafter Article 50 Letter], https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-
ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50.   
2.  See European Council (Art. 50) Guidelines for Brexit Negotiations, COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, Press Release 220/17 (Apr. 29, 2017) [hereinafter Guidelines for Brexit 
Negotiations], http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-
brexit-guidelines/. 
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Kingdom are asymmetric.3 UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s formal 
letter of notification specifically notes financial services, proposing 
that financial services market access be dealt with in a Free Trade 
Agreement and alluding to the two potentially intractable issues that 
financial services access raises: how to manage future regulatory 
divergence between the European Union and United Kingdom so that 
a stable form of market access and related mutual recognition of 
standards can be designed; and how to deal with dispute resolution, 
given the UK’s insistence on avoiding the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.4 Notably, the European Council 
guidelines are silent on this issue. However, there are signs of 
disagreement to come in that, although the guidelines indicate a 
readiness to finalize and conclude a Free Trade Agreement once the 
United Kingdom is no longer an EU Member State, they also note 
that any future partnership must include appropriate enforcement and 
dispute resolution settlement mechanisms that do not affect the EU’s 
autonomy or, in particular, its decision-making procedures, and 
should safeguard financial stability in the Union and respect its 
regulatory and supervisory regime and standards and their 
application.5 
The Brexit negotiations and the management of the implications 
of Brexit can be expected to dominate UK policy and political 
discourse and to consume the machinery of the UK government over 
the next two years and beyond. Domestically, a Reform Act will be 
deployed to ensure most of EU law, including EU financial 
regulation, continues to operate in the United Kingdom on the UK’s 
withdrawal to avoid the gaping regulatory holes that would otherwise 
yawn in UK public law and regulation:6 administrative law in the 
United Kingdom has in many respects become a function of EU law 
and is often administered through EU agencies. Much of UK financial 
                                                                                                                                  
3.  On the distinct issues raised by financial services access, see John Armour, Brexit 
and Financial Services, 33 OX. REV. ECON. POL. S54 (2017); Niamh Moloney, The EU and 
its Investment Banker: Rethinking Equivalence for the EU Capital Market, LSE Law Society 
and Economy Working Paper Series, WP No 5/2017 (2017), available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2929229; Eilis Ferran, The UK as a Third Country in EU Financial Services 
Regulation, J. FINANC. REGUL. 40 (2017). 
4.  See Article 50 Letter, supra note 1, at 5. 
5.  Guidelines for Brexit Negotations, supra note 2, ¶¶ 21 & 23.  
6.  The Reform Bill was published on July 13, 2017.  See European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill (HC Bill 5), available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/
cbill/2017-2019/0005/18005.pdf.   
 
1338 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:5 
regulation derives from directly applicable EU regulations, which will 
fall away when the United Kingdom leaves the European Union. 
The negotiations also provide a point for reflection, to ponder 
the question posed by this symposium: how has EU financial 
regulation developed with the United Kingdom and how will EU 
financial regulation develop without the United Kingdom? 
The first part of this question, which represents the major part of 
this article, can be answered with a reasonable degree of confidence 
given the empirical evidence. The United Kingdom might best be 
described as the ‘grit in the oyster’ – an at times irritating presence 
which has nonetheless prompted the production of a pearl or, and 
perhaps stretching the metaphor too far, a regulatory system which, to 
a workable extent, serves the needs of the EU’s integrated financial 
system, makes some effort to be evidence-based, and preserves a 
degree of national regulatory autonomy and potential for productive 
experimentation. In reaching this conclusion the discussion draws on 
the comparative political economy literature, which considers the 
different preferences which have shaped EU financial regulation, and 
on empirical observation of the UK’s negotiating positions. 
A satisfactory answer to the second part of the question is more 
elusive as it requires prediction. EU financial regulation now takes the 
form of a sophisticated pan-EU governance system with regulatory, 
supervisory, rescue/resolution, and enforcement components. This 
governance system is supported by a fragile but thus far resilient 
institutional eco-system, within which the interlocking single market 
(the European System of Financial Supervision) and euro area 
(Banking Union) institutional mechanisms uneasily co-exist. The 
absence of the United Kingdom will be felt across all the component 
elements of EU financial governance, and across the single market 
and euro area. This discussion narrows the wide field of inquiry by 
focusing on regulatory governance7 and by considering two spheres 
of EU financial regulatory competence: the single market (internal); 
and the international market (external). Single market regulatory 
governance is not given the array of factors which shape EU financial 
                                                                                                                                  
7.  This article does not accordingly consider supervision or enforcement or the impact 
of the UK’s departure on the institutional structures of EU financial governance, notably 
Banking Union (euro area) and the European System of Financial Supervision (single market). 
For an examination of the potential consequences for institutional organization, see generally 
Niamh Moloney, Brexit and EU Financial Governance: Business as Usual or Institutional 
Change, 42 EUR. L. REV. 112 (2017). 
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regulatory governance, likely to experience material Brexit-related 
change, but it can be expected to bend more to uniformity. In her 
major speech on the UK’s negotiating strategy on January 17, 2017 
Prime Minister May suggested that ‘the EU bends towards 
uniformity, not flexibility.’8 In the absence of the United Kingdom, 
EU financial regulation is likely to become more, and not less, 
harmonized. But UK legacy effects, primarily in the form of a 
commitment towards proportionality, should moderate the risks of EU 
financial regulation becoming overly standardized and insufficiently 
calibrated to distinct market segments. The impact of the withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom on the EU’s approach to the international 
financial market is difficult to predict given the relevance of geo-
politics. But a need to signal the openness of the EU financial market 
post Brexit can be expected to have some traction on how the EU’s 
international posture develops. 
II.  SINGLE MARKET REGULATION: THE UNITED KINGDOM 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION - THE ODD COUPLE? 
A. The UK and EU Financial Regulation: Multiple Channels for 
Influencing 
EU financial regulation is a highly contested sphere of EU 
competence. It seeks to do two things: to support the construction of 
an integrated, single financial system with minimal regulatory 
frictions;9 and to regulate that financial system so that the pathologies 
of integration, notably cross-border risk transmission and financial 
instability, are minimized and managed. Markets are regulated and 
risks are managed by means of a granular, harmonized ‘single 
rulebook,’ which has highly detailed legislative, administrative, and 
                                                                                                                                  
8.  Prime Minister Theresa May, The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting 
the EU: PM Speech (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-
governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech. 
9.  The ECB has described a financial market for a given set of instruments/services as 
fully integrated if all potential market participants with the same relevant characteristics: face a 
single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments/services; have 
equal access to such instruments/services; and are treated equally when they are active in the 
market. See European Central Bank, Financial Integration in Europe (Apr. 2016), at 4, 
available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope201604.
en.pdf.   
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soft law components.10 Market construction is supported by means of 
the related regulatory ‘passport,’ which allows regulated financial 
actors to operate cross-border in the European Union on the basis of 
authorization and supervision in their ‘home’ Member State – 
typically the Member State in which the financial actor is registered.11 
‘Host’ Member States can defer to authorization and supervision by 
home Member States, and accept the risks associated with cross-
border financial activity, because of the harmonized single rulebook 
under which home supervisors must operate.12 The regulatory and 
market construction functions that the single rulebook performs have 
a relatively straightforward and appealing logic, but the single 
rulebook has been forged in a crucible in which an array of competing 
preferences, including those of the United Kingdom, have fought for 
dominance. 
The dense and ever-expanding nature of the single rulebook, and 
the organization of the EU law-making process, mean that it is 
possible to trace the UK’s preferences and their influence on EU 
financial regulation – at least at the legislative level. The macro 
design of EU financial regulation follows the ‘Lamfalussy model,’ 
which imposes a hierarchy of norms approach. It segments financial 
regulation into: level 1 legislative rules; level 2 administrative rules; 
level 3 soft law and supervisory convergence measures; and level 4 
enforcement of Member State compliance by the Commission.13 The 
intergovernmental ECOFIN Council, in which the EU Member States 
are represented through their finance ministers, adopts level 1 
legislation in the financial governance area, under a qualified majority 
vote (QMV),14 with the supranational European Parliament 
                                                                                                                                  
10.  Supervisory and enforcement techniques and related institutional structures also 
support market construction and risk management but are not considered in this discussion. 
11.  On the nature and purpose of EU financial regulation, see generally EUROPEAN 
CAPITAL MARKETS LAW (Rudiger Veil ed., Hart, 2d. ed. 2017); Niamh Moloney, EU 
SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION (3d ed. 2014). 
12.  Host supervisors are also supported by the supervisory communication, 
coordination, and convergence arrangements, which apply within the European System of 
Financial Supervision. 
13.  The Lamfalussy approach was adopted by the European Union in 2001 as a means 
for expediting the law-making process in the financial regulation area (which was then 
receiving serious policy and political attention for the first time) and was refined over the crisis 
era. See Moloney, supra note 11, at 862-86. 
14.  A QMV is fifty-five percent of the currently twenty-eight Council members, 
comprising at least fifteen of them, and representing Member States comprising at least sixty-
five percent of the EU population. A blocking minority for a measure must include at least 
four Council members, absent which the QMV is deemed to be attained. See Consolidated 
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(composed of directly elected representatives) as a ‘co-legislator.’15 
The European Commission, the EU’s supranational executive and 
bureaucracy, proposes legislation. This discussion focuses on the 
UK’s direct political influence on EU financial regulation as a 
Member State in the ECOFIN Council. There are numerous other 
channels through which UK influence on legislation has been exerted, 
including the European Parliament.16 The highly organized and well-
resourced City of London lobbying groups have also, through a range 
of different portals, including through the Commission and European 
Parliament, shaped EU financial regulation, although the nature of 
this influence is more difficult to track.17 
One of the major channels for influence is technocratic rather 
than overtly political and relates to the massive and fast-growing 
corpus of level 2 administrative law, which forms part of the single 
rulebook. The United Kingdom is a member of the three European 
Supervisory Authorities (the European Banking Authority (EBA); the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)), which 
are charged with an array of quasi-regulatory and supervisory 
functions in relation to the single market in financial services. UK 
regulators (the Prudential Regulation Authority/Bank of England and 
Financial Conduct Authority) sit on the Boards of Supervisors of the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which are composed of 
                                                                                                                                  
Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 16, 2012 O.J. C 362/13, at 4 [hereinafter TEU 
post-Lisbon]. 
15.  Financial regulation is adopted under the multi-stage ordinary legislative procedure 
under which the Council and Parliament act as co-legislators in that each holds a veto. See 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 294, 2012 
O.J. C 326/47, at 174 [hereinafter TFEU]. In practice, compromise positions are usually 
achieved under the informal ‘fast track’ process under which closed ‘trilogue’ negotiations, 
held between the Commission, Parliament and Council once the Parliament and Council have 
adopted negotiating positions, produce the legislative outcome. See Moloney, supra note 11, at 
890. 
16.  Parliamentary channels include the UK MEPs on the influential European 
Parliament Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee, which deals with financial 
governance. The UK’s engagement through the European Parliament has been identified as 
being less effective than its engagement in other EU fora, given in part the diffusion of UK 
MEPs across different European Parliament political groupings. See Norton Rose Fulbright, 
SHAPING LEGISLATION: UK ENGAGEMENT IN EU FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY-MAKING 
(2016). 
17.  It has been reported that the UK finance lobby spends over EU€34 million annually 
in seeking to influence EU financial regulation. See Lobbying for the City of London: The Fire 
Power of the UK Financial Sector in Brussels, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY (2016), 
https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/ukfinancialfirepower.pdf.   
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national supervisors from the EU 28 Member States and which act as 
the ESAs’ decision-making bodies. The ESAs do not have the power 
to adopt level 2 administrative rules (this power rests with the 
Commission), but they propose administrative rules to the 
Commission (based on mandates contained in legislation) and advise 
the Commission on their content; the ESAs also adopt soft law (level 
3 under the Lamfalussy model).18 Since the establishment of the 
ESAs in 2011 as part of the EU’s crisis-era financial governance 
reforms, and the related enhancement of the EU’s technical capacity 
to adopt detailed administrative rules, EU financial regulation has 
become significantly more granular and administrative in nature. The 
ESAs have accordingly become a location for the imposition of 
national preferences. 
The political/national influences on ESA decision-making can be 
difficult to track as the Boards of Supervisors, while often attuned to 
national rather than supranational/EU preferences,19 tend to operate 
by consensus, and formal votes (ESA quasi-regulatory decision-
making operates under a qualified majority vote) are relatively rare. It 
is nonetheless possible to conclude from the public record of Board of 
Supervisor decision-making20 that the United Kingdom has been a 
significant influence on ESA deliberations. This influence flows from 
its strong technical capacity and its long experience in regulating the 
EU’s largest financial market, as well as its support of the ESAs by 
means of secondments from UK regulators and its involvement in the 
different technical working groups through which the ESAs operate. 
The United Kingdom has not always been able to impose its 
preferences, mirroring the experience in the ECOFIN Council 
(discussed below). The United Kingdom was, for example, part of a 
minority coalition of regulators on EBA, which did not support 
EBA’s approach to the adoption of guidelines, which would have 
required a restrictive approach to the EU rules that govern executive 
                                                                                                                                  
18.  On the ESAs’ quasi-regulatory powers in relation to administrative rule-making and 
soft law, see Moloney, supra note 11, at 907-35; Madalina Busuioc, Rule-Making by the 
European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope, 19 EUR. L.J. 111 (2013).   
19.  A frequent criticism of ESA Board of Supervisor decision-making is that it is not 
sufficiently supranational/EU in orientation. See generally Commission Public Consultation on 
the Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities (2017) [hereinafter Commission ESA 
Public Consultation]. 
20.  Through the publicly available minutes of the three Boards of Supervisors, 
available on the websites of the three ESAs, http://www.eba.europa.eu/, https://www.
esma.europa.eu/, https://eiopa.europa.eu/.  
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remuneration in banks.21 Similarly, the United Kingdom, along with a 
minority group of Member State regulators, did not support guidelines 
which ESMA adopted in relation to short selling,22 reflecting its 
distinct interests in supporting liquidity in the UK’s globally-oriented 
trading market. Overall, it has been a key technical support to the 
ESAs since 2011. 
B. The UK and EU Financial Regulation: Politics and Preferences 
The focus of this discussion, however, is on primary level 1 
legislation and on the UK’s direct influence on ECOFIN Council 
discussions. 
The Member States who, in the ECOFIN Council, adopt level 1 
EU financial regulation along with the European Parliament, have 
long had different preferences in this area. Despite a longstanding EU 
policy commitment to diversify sources of funding in the EU away 
from the dominant bank channel,23 patterns of financial system 
development still vary significantly across the European Union. 
Regular reviews from the European Commission and the ECB 
repeatedly report on, for example, diverging levels of recourse by 
firms across the European Union to market-based instruments for 
raising funds; uneven securitization patterns (an indicator for the 
extent to which market-based intermediation24 is used to diversify 
bank funding risks); and different levels of penetration of bank-based 
                                                                                                                                  
21.  See PRA and FCA statement on compliance with the EBA Guidelines on Sound 
Remuneration Policies, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Feb. 29, 2016) [hereinafter 
Statement on Compliance with EBA Remuneration Guidelines], https://www.fca.org.uk/
news/statements/pra-and-fca-statement-compliance-eba-guidelines-sound-remuneration-
policies. 
22.  See European Securities and Markets Authority, Guidelines Compliance Table 
(ESMA/2013/765) (June 19, 2013) [hereinafter ESMA Compliance Table], available at 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2013-
765_guidelines_compliance_table_-_market_making_guidelines.pdf.  
23.  This policy concern has been a decisive influence on EU financial governance 
policy. It has been expressed most recently in the current Capital Markets Union agenda. See 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (15) 468 
Final (Sept. 2015).   
24.  Market intermediation refers to the process whereby actors in the financial markets 
‘intermediate’ between suppliers and seekers of capital by, for example, providing risk 
management products and supporting trading in securities. On intermediation, see Moloney, 
supra note 11, at 320-25. 
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funding.25 Overall, a move toward more market-based funding can be 
identified,26 but the EU financial market does not have a 
homogeneous structure. Accordingly, distinct and typically 
longstanding underlying economic models and diverging patterns of 
financial system have shaped often sharply different national 
preferences27 with respect to market construction and related financial 
regulation.28 The form of capitalism which the European Union 
should follow; the style of regulation which should encourage or 
control it; the location of regulatory intervention (EU harmonization 
or local flexibility; euro area or single market); the extent to which 
related risks should be mutualized across the Member States through 
institutional structures - all been sharply contested politically. 
The UK’s distinct financial system has molded its preferences 
regarding EU financial regulation. Although funding to the UK 
domestic market remains heavily based on bank credit,29 the United 
Kingdom, through the City of London, hosts the largest wholesale 
financial services market in the European Union, acting, in effect, as 
the investment banker to the EU 27. The importance of this function 
has been repeatedly highlighted in the current Brexit policy and 
political discourse in the United Kingdom, which has underlined the 
risks to the United Kingdom (and the European Union) if its access to 
the EU market is disrupted.30 Some 37% of assets under management 
                                                                                                                                  
25.  See, eg., Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working 
Document, European Financial Stability and Integration Review (EFSIR): A focus on Capital 
Markets Union, SWD (16) 146 Final (Apr. 2016).   
26.  See the discussions of different Member State markets in MARKET-BASED 
BANKING AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Ian Hardie & David Howarth eds., 
2013). 
27.  As the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature predicts. For the foundational work, see 
generally VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
28.  For recent examples, see David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, Brexit and the Single 
European Financial Market, 55 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. (2017), DOI: 
10.1111/jcms.12589; David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, Internationalized Banking, Alternative 
Banks, and the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 39 WEST EUR. POL. 438 (2016); Lucia 
Quaglia, David Howarth, & Moritz Liebe, The Political Economy of European Capital 
Markets Union 54 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 185 (2016).   
29.  See Ian Hardie & Sylvia Maxfield, Market-based Banking as the Worst of all 
Worlds: Illustrations from the United States and the United Kingdom in Hardie & Howarth, 
supra note 26, at 56.   
30.  See, e.g., EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, REPORT, 2016-17, HL 81, ¶ 116 (UK) 
(noting the UK’s large trade surplus with the EU in financial services and the reliance of the 
wider EU economy on services provided in the UK); Simeon Djankov, The City of London 
After Brexit, LSE Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 762 (2017) (outlining the 
2017] BENDING TO UNIFORMITY 1345 
in the European Union are managed in the United Kingdom31 and 
around 85% of European hedge funds are based in London.32 Some 
46% of equity funding raised in the European Union is raised in the 
United Kingdom,33 and some 74% of over-the-counter trading in 
interest rate derivatives and 78% of foreign exchange trading takes in 
place in London, while twice as many euros are traded in London as 
in the euro area.34 Overall, around 25% of UK financial services 
revenue derives from EU international and wholesale financial 
services business35 and some 35% of all wholesale financial services 
activity in the European Union takes place in the United Kingdom.36 
The market orientation of the UK financial system has led to the 
United Kingdom usually forming part of what the comparative 
political economy literature has termed the facilitative ‘market-
making’ as compared to the more prescriptive ‘market-shaping’ 
coalition in the Council.37 Membership of these coalitions is fluid, 
depending on the issue at stake; Germany’s position in particular can 
vary, although as a bank-based system it might be expected to form 
part of the market-shaping grouping. Broadly, the market-making 
coalition in the Council has typically advocated for a style of EU 
financial regulation, which is facilitative and promotes market access 
and liberalization. This coalition, usually composed of Member States 
with stronger capital markets and a stronger international presence in 
their markets, and including the United Kingdom, the Nordic Member 
States, and the Netherlands, is also broadly sympathetic to market-
based intermediation as opposed to bank-based intermediation.38 In 
                                                                                                                                  
scale of the potential losses to the City, including in terms of a three percent drop in City of 
London employment).   
31.  See European Parliament, Briefing, M. Magnus, A. Margerit, and B. Mesnard, 
Brexit: the United Kingdom and EU Financial Services, PE 587.384 (Dec. 9, 2016) 
[hereinafter EU Briefing]. 
32.  See The UK: Europe’s financial centre, THECITYUK (Aug. 2016), available for 
download at https://www.thecityuk.com/research/the-uk-europes-financial-centre/.   
33.  See generally EU Briefing, supra note 31. 
34.  THECITYUK, supra note 32, at 3-4. 
35.  See generally Oliver Wyman, The Impact of the UK’s Exit From the EU on the UK-
Based Financial Services Sector 6 (2016), available at http://www.oliverwyman.com/
content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/oct/Brexit_POV.PDF.   
36.   Id. at 2. 
37.  See Quaglia & Howarth, supra note 28, at 2; Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ 
Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the EU, 17 NEW POL. ECON. 15 (2012); Lucia 
Quaglia, Completing the Single Market in Financial Services: the Politics of Competing 
Advocacy Coalitions, 17 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1007 (2010).   
38.  See, e.g.,  Quaglia, Howarth, & Liebe, supra note 28. 
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terms of regulatory design, although EU financial regulation has 
become more behaviorally-oriented and interventionist over time, the 
market-making coalition can be supportive of transparency and 
disclosure techniques over behavioral regulation, and can be more 
open to market substitutes for intervention. The market-making 
coalition also typically advocates for more national discretion and for 
finer calibration to the distinct features of local markets. The market-
shaping coalition, by contrast, often associated with France, Spain, 
and Italy, typically takes a more interventionist posture and adopts a 
more prominent regulatory bias. In terms of financial system model, 
this coalition can, being composed of Member States whose financial 
systems have a strong bank orientation, be suspicious of intense levels 
of market intermediation, although this varies: France has been a 
prominent supporter of securitization.39 In terms of regulatory design, 
this coalition can be wary of market substitutes for regulatory 
intervention. It also typically promotes harmonization over national 
discretion. Over time, and reflecting the wide range of factors that 
play on preference formation, the balance of power in the Council has 
ebbed and flowed between both coalitions. 
The major themes associated with the UK’s influence on EU 
financial regulation are considered in the following sections. But they 
should not be over-weighted. Distinct Member State preferences form 
only a part, if a significant part, of the wider, complex, and dynamic 
array of influences and drivers that shape EU financial law. It cannot 
be said that the United Kingdom has, in any real sense, been an 
architect of the current regulatory system. While the United Kingdom 
has certainly influenced it, the current system has been forged in the 
crucible of the financial crisis, shaped by the international reform 
agenda, and finessed by a complex array of EU-specific preferences 
and influences. The United Kingdom has nonetheless left a distinct 
mark on EU financial regulation. Much of the technical rigour in the 
single rulebook can be credited to the United Kingdom, which has 
brought the experience of regulating Europe’s largest market to bear 
on rule drafting. The United Kingdom has also ensured that EU 
financial regulation is relatively well differentiated, tends to apply 
tailored rules to distinct market segment, and embeds the 
proportionality principle. 
                                                                                                                                  
39.  See David Howarth, State Intervention and Market Based Banking in France in 
Hardie & Howarth, supra note 26, at 128. 
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C.  A Liberal Approach to Intervention 
The United Kingdom has been a leading member of the liberally 
oriented, market-making coalition since EU financial regulatory 
governance began to mature and intensify. This point can be dated to 
1999 and the EU’s liberalizing Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) agenda, a 42-measure project designed to liberalize the EU 
financial market and to promote market-based funding, and which can 
be regarded as the foundation of modern EU financial regulation.40 
The United Kingdom has repeatedly sought to liberalize access 
to EU financial markets through regulatory governance techniques 
and to ensure that related EU financial regulation is appropriately 
differentiated so that it reflects the distinct risks posed by different 
market actors and segments. This position reflects the diversity of 
actors within the UK financial system and the competitive advantage 
of the United Kingdom in relation to wholesale market services. For 
example, prior to the financial crisis, the United Kingdom was a 
leading supporter of the FSAP agenda41 and its imprints can be seen 
on several key measures from this period. The pivotal FSAP-era 
Prospectus Directive 2003,42 for example, governs the disclosure 
document (the prospectus) required of firms (issuers) when they 
access the capital markets. It also liberalizes funding markets, 
allowing issuers to access EU markets on the basis of a single ‘home’ 
authorization of the prospectus. The United Kingdom argued strongly 
for differentiation in this measure and for the wholesale, professional 
funding markets, particularly the bond markets, to benefit from a 
series of exemptions. These exemptions have, over time been 
extended, supported by the United Kingdom. The most recent 
iteration of the Prospectus Directive, the recently agreed 2017 
Prospectus Regulation,43 contains numerous exemptions for the 
                                                                                                                                  
40.  See Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Implementing 
the Framework for Financial Markets Action Plan, COM (99) 232 Final (May 1999) 
[hereinafter Implementation Communication]. 
41.  See HM Treasury & FSA, Strengthening the EU Regulatory and Supervisory 
Framework: A Practical Approach (Nov. 2007). 
42.  See Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC 2003 O.J. L 345/64.   
43.  Regulation 2017/1129/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a 
regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC 2017 O.J. L 168/12. For the original 
Commission proposal, see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
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wholesale markets. Over the negotiations on the 2017 amendments 
the United Kingdom strongly supported the raising of exemption 
thresholds so that offering costs were reduced for smaller issuers and 
a more proportionate approach adopted.44 
Similarly, the United Kingdom opposed a prescriptive approach 
to the regulation of equity market trading during the negotiations on 
the FSAP-era Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I 2004 
(MiFID I)45 – the first major EU measure to govern investment 
services and trading venues. It was designed to liberalize cross-border 
activity by means of harmonized rules that would allow cross-border 
activity on the basis of ‘home’ authorization and supervision (home 
being the Member State where the actor in question was registered). 
The regulation of trading venues and related order execution (trading) 
has long been a flash-point in EU financial regulation, with France 
and the United Kingdom having sharply different approaches to the 
regulation of equity trading. France has long been suspicious of pan-
EU competition between equity order execution venues, which can be 
traced back to early battles over the 1993 Investment Services 
Directive (ISD)46 and to France’s attempts then to prevent trading of 
French shares on the SEAQ-International trading venue in London. 
The United Kingdom, by contrast, has long supported competitive 
and multiple venues for trading, reflecting its dominance in off-venue, 
over-the-counter (OTC) trading, and has fought against any protection 
of ‘national champions’ in the form of dominant national stock 
exchanges.47 Over the MiFID I negotiations, these longstanding 
differences came to a head. MiFID I was, overall, a liberalizing 
measure, abolishing the earlier ISD ‘concentration’ rule which 
allowed Member States to route trading to major trading venues in 
                                                                                                                                  
Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted 
to trading, COM(2015) 583. 
44.  See Letter from HM Treasury to House of Lords European Union Committee (May 
6, 2016).   
45.  See Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. L 145/1. 
46.  See Council Directive 93/22/EC on investment services in the securities field, 1993 
O.J. L 141/27. 
47.  On the fraught history of European Union trading venue regulation, see Moloney, 
supra note 11, at 435-38. 
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their markets.48 But sharp differences arose between the Member 
States as to how the newly liberalized order execution market should 
be regulated. To protect its liberal and competitive approach to 
trading regulation, which was based on facilitating competition 
between traditional stock exchanges, alternative trading venues, and 
other OTC execution systems, the United Kingdom fiercely resisted 
proposals that would have imposed the same set of stock-exchange-
oriented rules (particularly transparency rules) on other execution 
venues, including firms dealing in securities, severely limiting their 
ability to compete. This position reflected intense UK market hostility 
to the imposition of a ‘one size fits all’ stock-exchange oriented-
approach to trading venue regulation.49 While the United Kingdom 
was not successful in achieving a fully differentiated approach to 
trading venue regulation under MiFID I, it succeeded in including a 
series of relaxations from the most onerous of the trading rules for 
investment firms providing dealing services in a systematic and 
organized manner (‘systematic internalizers’).50 These differences in 
approaches to trading venue regulation have persisted in the Council. 
During the negotiations on the successor measure to MiFID I, the 
2014 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II/Markets in 
Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFID II/MiFIR), which comes 
into force in 2018,51 the United Kingdom, in often difficult 
                                                                                                                                  
48.  The ISD concentration rule followed difficult and highly politicized negotiations 
which saw the ‘Alliance’ group of Member States (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) support competition in trading/order execution and the 
‘Club Med’ group (France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Belgium) demand the 
centralization of all transactions on major stock exchanges in order to support liquidity and 
ensure a high level of investor protection. Protectionist undercurrents were strong during the 
negotiations, with certain Member States concerned to protect their markets from the then-
dominant London Stock Exchange. A compromise position was finally adopted which made 
the concentration rule optional for Member States (the United Kingdom did not apply it) and 
imposed conditions on its use. 
49.  Among the influential industry position papers was the one presented by a group of 
leading trade associations. See Association of Private Client Investment Managers and 
Stockbrokers – European Association of Securities Dealers et. al., Innovation, Competition, 
Diversity, Choice, A European capital market for the 21st Century (May 21, 2002), 
http://www.isdadocs.org/speeches/pdf/Innovation_Competition_Diversity_Choice.pdf. 
50.   On preference formation in relation to EU trading venue regulation, see generally 
Guido Ferrarini and Niamh Moloney, Reshaping Order Execution in the EU and the Role of 
Interest Groups: From MiFID I to MiFID II, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 557 (2012). 
51.  See Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. L 173/349 (MiFID II); Regulation 600/2014/EU of the European 
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negotiations,52 repeatedly raised the dangers associated with the new 
measure’s extension of MiFID I’s transparency rules to trading in 
asset classes beyond equity, unless the rules were carefully calibrated 
to address liquidity risks. This posture reflects the UK’s interests as 
the major EU centre for trading and dealing in derivatives and 
bonds.53 
Over the financial crisis, the market-shaping coalition came into 
the ascendant in the Council.54 An anti-speculation agenda and a 
related suspicion of market intensity in some political quarters 
combined to give EU financial regulation a more interventionist 
quality. Much of EU financial regulation from this period relates to 
the EU’s implementation of the G20 reform agenda, however, and 
cannot be associated entirely with Member States’ political 
preferences. Nonetheless, there was some political pressure for a 
market-dampening agenda, which was resisted by the United 
Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom opposed much of the 2012 Short Selling 
Regulation,55 for example, arguing that a restrictive approach to short 
selling could damage market liquidity.56 It also resisted much of the 
highly contested 2011 Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
                                                                                                                                  
Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012, 2014 O.J. L 173/84 (MiFIR). 
52.  The negotiations were reported as being fierce, particularly between the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. See Philip Stafford & James Fontanella-Khan, UK agrees EU 
deal on City regulation, FIN. TIMES 18 (June 18, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/c9c9294a-
d75b-11e2-8279-00144feab7de.  
53.  During the development of MiFID II/MiFIR the UK Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) (now Financial Conduct Authority) warned that the imposition of transparency 
requirements on the trading of non-equity asset classes required careful calibration if adverse 
impacts on liquidity were to be avoided. See FSA, The FSA’s Markets Regulatory Agenda 
(2010), pp 33-34. Since then, the United Kingdom has called for careful post-implementation 
review of how the new rules might impact on non-equity trading. See HM Treasury, Response 
to the EU Commission: Call for evidence on EU regulatory framework for financial services 
(Feb. 2016), 16-18. 
54.  For measure-by-measure analysis, see Moloney, supra note 11; Eilis Ferran, Crisis-
driven Regulatory Reform: Where in the World is the EU Going? in Eilis Ferran, et. al., THE 
REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 (2012).   
55.  See Regulation 236/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, 2012 O.J. L 86/1 [hereinafter Short 
Selling Regulation]. 
56.  The United Kingdom was particularly opposed to any prohibition on ‘uncovered’ 
sovereign credit default swaps, given the potential prejudice to liquidity in the sovereign debt 
market, pressure on sovereign borrowing costs, damage to the ability of the European Union to 
recover from the financial crisis, and damage to legitimate hedging activities. See Ian Wishart, 
Council, MEPs at odd on Short Selling and Supervision, EUROPEAN VOICE, 7 (July 7, 2011).  
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Directive,57 which imposes a new set of regulatory requirements on 
the previously lightly-regulated alternative investment fund sector - 
and which could have had a potentially disproportionate impact on the 
United Kingdom as the major EU centre for alternative funds, 
including hedge funds.58 The UK’s reluctant agreement to the 
Directive, after bitter negotiations, was reported as being linked to a 
pragmatic calculation not to deploy any further political capital on a 
measure that was strongly supported by France and Germany, in light 
of the need to keep capital for the parallel and similarly difficult 
negotiations on the new European Supervisory Authorities.59 The 
United Kingdom did, nonetheless, achieve a number of successes, 
including the removal of a direct cap on fund leverage and a more 
proportionate approach to regulatory reporting requirements.60 The 
UK’s opposition to more dirigiste, market-shaping measures is 
similarly evident in its opposition to the 2011 proposal for a Financial 
Transaction Tax.61 Most famously, perhaps, it was outvoted 27:1 on 
the Council vote to restrict bankers’ bonuses (to a ratio of 100 percent 
of salary, or 200 percent with approval)62 under the 2010 Capital 
Requirements Directive III.63 
The United Kingdom was more successful in imposing its 
preferences on the 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
                                                                                                                                  
57.  See Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC 
and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. L 174/1 [hereinafter 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive]. 
58.  On the negotiations, see generally Eilis Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379 (2011); Barbara 
Sennholz-Weinhardt, Regulatory Competition as Social Fact: Constructing and Contesting the 
Threat of Hedge Fund Managers’ Relocation from Britain, 21 (6) REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 
1240 (2014).   
59.  See George Parker et al., Osborne bows to EU Hedge Fund Rules, FIN. TIMES (May 
19, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/319a20c4-62bb-11df-b1d1-00144feab49a.  
60.  See Norton Rose Fulbright, supra note 16, at 25. 
61.  The tax, which continues to struggle in the Council, was originally proposed in 
2011 to a cacophony of protest including but not only from the United Kingdom. See 
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on a common 
system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM (11) 594 Final 
(2011).   
62.  See A. Barber et al., Brussels Deals Rare Blow to City on Bonuses, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 28, 2013).   
63.  See Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the 
trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies, 
2010 O.J. L 329/3. 
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(EMIR),64 one of the pillars of the EU’s crisis-era reform program, 
which restructures how trading and clearing is organized in the OTC 
derivatives markets, requiring the routing of much of trading and 
clearing through market infrastructures. The distinct technical 
expertize that the United Kingdom could offer has been identified as a 
major determinant of the UK’s successes over the negotiation of this 
highly complex but operationally critical measure.65 
The UK’s resistance to the crisis-era reforms, and the impact of 
that resistance, should not be overplayed. The incidences of 
opposition noted above were substantial and did shape the 
negotiations. But they were also exceptions in a wide-reaching reform 
process, which saw a vast array of financial market rules supported by 
the Council. The crisis-era reforms were, by and large, supported by 
the United Kingdom and have been shaped by the UK’s technical 
expertise. A UK Parliament report on the crisis-era reform process 
concluded that while aspects of the reforms were problematic for the 
United Kingdom, overall the United Kingdom would have 
implemented the vast bulk of the reforms had it acted unilaterally; 
and, that, in a number of cases, the United Kingdom had gone further 
than the minimum required under EU law, ‘gold-plating’ EU rules 
(adding additional obligations for UK actors).66 The report also noted 
the technical influence that the United Kingdom had brought to 
bear.67 Presciently, it warned that the UK’s influence was diminishing 
and could diminish further, given, inter alia, the then-ongoing debate 
on the UK’s place in the European Union, perceptions of UK 
antipathy to EU intervention, and an insufficient commitment to the 
‘hard graft’ of effective lobbying, negotiation, and alliance building.68 
D. Local Discretion and Autonomy 
The United Kingdom has not as a rule resisted the construction 
of the single rulebook. At an early stage of the financial crisis reforms 
the UK Financial Services Authority supported the construction of 
what has since become the detailed single rulebook for financial 
                                                                                                                                  
64.  See Regulation 648/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, 2012 O.J. L 201/1. 
65.  See Norton Rose Fulbright, supra note 16, at 25. 
66.  See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, REPORT, 2014-15, HL Paper 103, ¶ 240-43 
(UK).  
67.  See id. ¶ 244-46  
68.  See id. ¶ 261  
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services, and suggested that as between ‘More Europe’ and ‘Less 
Europe,’ ‘More Europe’ should prevail.69 Its support has not derived 
primarily from a commitment to standardization, or to EU-led rule-
making, but reflects a pragmatic recognition of the ‘passporting’ 
benefits that flow from the single rulebook:70 once authorized in its 
home Member State (typically the State of registration), a financial 
actor registered in the European Union can, under the financial 
‘passport,’ provide services and establish branches cross-border 
without host State regulation or supervision, subject to some limited 
exceptions. The passport has been widely used in the United 
Kingdom, with some 5,000 passports covering the export of financial 
services business from the United Kingdom to the European Union.71 
The United Kingdom has, however, repeatedly championed 
subsidiarity and national regulatory discretion, particularly in relation 
to the more intrusive financial-crisis-era reforms. It advocated for 
greater national discretion under the 2013 Capital Requirements 
Directive IV/Capital Requirements Regulation (CRD IV/CRR),72 a 
central pillar of EU financial regulation which contains the EU’s 
banking rulebook and which implements the Basel III Accord. It was 
particularly concerned to protect domestic regulatory autonomy in 
relation to the application of capital and other prudential tools to 
manage local risks to financial stability.73 Similarly, over the 
negotiations on the 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR, which provides the core of 
the EU’s investment services/trading rulebook, the United Kingdom 
was a leading member of the Council coalition which successfully 
protected a degree of Member State autonomy and industry choice in 
                                                                                                                                  
69.  FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW, A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 100-105 (Mar. 2009).   
70.  HM GOVERNMENT, HM TREASURY ANALYSIS: THE LONG TERM ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF EU MEMBERSHIP AND THE ALTERNATIVES, Cm. 9250 (Apr. 2016).   
71.  See Letter from Andrew Bailey, FCA Chairman, to Andrew Tyrie, House of 
Commons Treasury Committee Chair (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/
commons-committees/treasury/Correspondence/AJB-to-Andrew-Tyrie-Passporting.PDF. 
72.  See Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on access 
to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. L 176/338 (CRD IV); Regulation 575/2013/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. L 176/1 (CRR). 
73.  On the negotiations, see Scott James, The Domestic Politics of Financial 
Regulation: Informal Ratification Games and the EU Capital Requirement Negotiations, 21 
NEW POL. ECON. 187 (2016). 
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relation to the otherwise extensive transparency and other rules which 
apply to trading in financial instruments.74 
In the current ‘open’ negotiations in which the United Kingdom 
will participate until it leaves the European Union, its concern to 
protect local discretion has not diminished. It has, for example, raised 
concerns as to the Commission’s proposal to remove many of the 
‘options and national discretions’ (ONDs) contained in the CRD 
IV/CRR banking rulebook,75 which it originally supported, and 
warned that it would strongly object to any proposal to reduce 
national discretion which was driven by the needs of the euro area.76 
The United Kingdom will, however, have limited (or no) political 
capital in these negotiations. 
E. Regulatory Design: Proportionality and Impact Assessment 
Reflecting its support for local discretion, the United Kingdom 
has long supported proportionality in the application of EU financial 
regulation. It recently called for a more proportionate approach to be 
adopted to EU financial regulation generally,77 and was particularly 
concerned to ensure proportionality in relation to the governance 
requirements imposed on financial institutions, notably in relation to 
executive pay. The need for proportionality is a recurring theme of the 
UK’s current approach to the open negotiations in which it will 
participate until it withdraws from the European Union. In the 
ongoing negotiations on the new securitization regime, for example, it 
has argued for a more proportionate approach to the new rules 
                                                                                                                                  
74.  On the negotiations, see Moloney, supra note 11, at 456-57. 
75.  Set out in, Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards 
exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, 
remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures, COM (16) 
854 Final (Nov. 2016); Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as 
regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible 
liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures 
to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, COM (16) 850 Final (Nov. 2016). 
76.  See Letter from HM Treasury to House of Lords, European Union Committee, (Jan. 
2016), available at http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/memorandum/
communication-from-the-commission-to-the-european-parliament-the-council-the-european-
central-bank-the-1449009130.  
77.  See HM Treasury, supra note 53, at 27-33. The response highlights difficulties with 
the proportionate application of: financial reporting rules to smaller firms; capital requirements 
to smaller banks; and financial rules more generally to non-financial counterparties. 
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proposed for due diligence, risk retention, and transparency, and has 
been concerned to reduce reporting burdens.78 
The United Kingdom has also long been a champion of 
evidence-based policy making and of impact assessment, which, 
while still developing,79 have become significantly more secure in EU 
financial regulation policy design in recent years.80 This is clear from 
the UK’s input into the Commission’s major 2015-2016 review of the 
crisis-era reforms,81 but has been a recurring theme of UK 
interventions.82 
F. Policing the Rules of the Game: Recourse to the Referee 
Finally, the United Kingdom has shaped EU financial regulation 
by means of its vigilance in policing the constitutional/Treaty 
competence of the European Union in relation to financial regulation. 
EU financial regulation has not, despite its contested quality, led 
to many challenges before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. Political and institutional differences, particularly of a 
technical nature, are generally addressed by means of the 
                                                                                                                                  
78.  See Letter from HM Treasury to House of Lords, European Union Committee (Dec. 
1, 2015), available at http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2015/12/EST
_to_Lords_on_securitisation_01122015.pdf.  
79.  While the Commission engages in impact assessment of proposals and in post 
implementation review, the Council and Parliament do not provide impact assessments of the 
revisions they make to Commission proposals. For a critical assessment of the Commission’s 
approach to impact assessment and an analysis of related inter-institutional failures, see 
Andrea Renda, Too Good to be True? A Quick Assessment of the European Commission’s New 
Better Regulation Package, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Special Report No 
108/2015 (May 2015), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR108AR_BetterRegulation.pdf.   
80.  As is clear from the extensive ‘stock-take’ of EU financial regulation which the 
Commission engaged in over 2015-2016 (Commission of the European Communities, Call for 
Evidence, EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services (2015)) and the market 
assessment exercise undertaken in relation to the Capital Markets Union agenda (Commission 
of the European Communities, Initial reflections on the obstacles to the development of a deep 
and integrated EU capital markets, Staff Working Document, SWD (15) 13 Final (Feb. 18, 
2015)). Institutionally, impact assessments of the different proposals developed by the 
Commission are reviewed by its Regulatory Scrutiny Board; rejections of assessments on 
quality grounds are not uncommon. 
81.  See HM Treasury, supra note 53, at 33-35 (highlighting the need to address 
excessive compliance costs and complexity); id. at 55-57 (on the need to monitor unexpected 
impacts). 
82.  Including those from the UK industry. See International Regulatory Strategy Group, 
The Cumulative Impact of EU Financial Services Regulation: Better Regulation for Jobs and 
Growth (June 2016), available at https://www.thecityuk.com/assets/2016/Reports-PDF/The-
cumulative-impact-of-EU-financial-services-regulation.pdf.  
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compromises made over the legislative process – and often by means 
of a delegation to the administrative rule-making process. Challenges, 
to the extent they arise, are typically limited, are usually directed to 
technical interpretations of EU financial regulation, and tend to arise 
from references from national courts. They are only rarely concerned 
with grander constitutional questions with political implications - the 
most important one in this area being the competence of the European 
Union to act in the financial regulation sphere.83 Competence 
allocation has nonetheless the potential to generate significant 
tensions between the European Union and its Member States in 
relation to financial regulation. Financial regulation is technocratic in 
nature, but has distributive consequences. Member States can have 
incentives to protect their sphere of sovereignty in this area, 
particularly as financial regulation can have implications for the 
supply of credit in an economy and, as the crisis-era has underlined, 
can lead to the imposition of fiscal burdens on tax-payers. The line 
between the EU’s single-market-oriented regulatory competences, 
and national competences, particularly in relation to supervision and 
the support of financial stability, can be expected to be policed, 
particularly where harmonizing regulatory measures tip into the 
supervisory/financial stability sphere where fiscal risks to the Member 
States are most acute. Over the financial crisis, as political support for 
greater risk-sharing and related coordination of supervision at the EU-
level strengthened, the United Kingdom deployed competence 
challenges to prevent the European Union from adopting single 
market measures which allowed it to intervene in national market 
structures or which raised the prospect of national supervisory powers 
been constrained. These single-market-oriented challenges reflect the 
UK’s related decision not to participate in the euro-area-oriented 
Banking Union. The UK’s decision was based on its characterization 
of Banking Union as flowing from Economic and Monetary Union 
and as being designed to protect the euro,84 but also reflected its 
concern not to lose sovereignty over bank supervision and the support 
of financial stability. 
                                                                                                                                  
83.  The challenge by Germany to the competence on which the original measure for 
harmonizing deposit guarantee schemes in the European Union (since repealed) was based 
provides an early and unusual example. See generally Germany v European Parliament and 
Council Case C-233/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-2441.   
84.  See EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, REPORT, 2012-13, HL 88, ¶ 129 (UK).   
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EU financial regulation is almost always based on Article 114 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which contains the EU 
competence to adopt harmonizing measures for the purposes of the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market, or on similar 
competences related to free movement, notably the freedom to 
establish. The Article 114 competence has generated most 
controversy as it has become almost infinitely elastic in the financial 
regulation sphere, being deployed over the financial crisis to support 
an array of measures that have pushed at the boundaries of what has 
traditionally been characterized as a ‘harmonizing’ measure for the 
support of the single market. Chief among these were the measures 
used to construct institutions, notably the ESAs, which strengthened 
the EU’s ability to shape national supervision and how financial 
stability was supported. Nonetheless, political exigencies over the 
crisis era meant that challenges to the EU’s competence to adopt 
measures designed to address the damage caused by the financial 
crisis and to reduce risk were always likely to be rare - once political 
and institutional support for the measure in question was in place. 
The United Kingdom has long been careful to monitor the 
competence of the European Union in financial governance over the 
legislative process. But it was only over the financial crisis era, when 
the risk of asymmetric rule impact became more acute as the single 
rulebook expanded and as the European Union began to stray into the 
national supervisory sphere to manage risk transmission, and the 
United Kingdom was not able to construct blocking coalitions in the 
Council, that it had regular recourse to the Court. In four high-profile 
cases, relating to the bankers’ bonus rules, the proposed financial 
transaction tax, the powers of the new European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), and the ‘location policy’ adopted by the 
ECB in relation to central clearing counterparties (CCPs), it 
challenged the competence of the European Union to act. In all four 
cases, the EU measure in question had potentially material impacts 
for the UK market, and the ESMA case squarely raised the UK’s 
opposition to single market measures that intervened in national 
supervisory autonomy. While it was unsuccessful in all apart from the 
ECB case, the actions underline the UK’s monitoring role in relation 
to EU competence and the risk of over-reach. 
In relation to the financial transaction tax proposal, the United 
Kingdom unsuccessfully challenged the spill-over effects of the 
proposed tax outside the ‘financial transaction tax-zone’ (the tax was 
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designed to operate between the group of Member States that 
voluntarily opted into it under the Treaty ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
rules) and on the single market more generally.85 In relation to the 
bankers’ bonus rules, the UK challenge86 was based on a number of 
grounds, including: that the bonus cap was not fit for purpose (to 
support financial stability) as it would lead to an increase in fixed 
salaries and fixed costs; the competence for the cap (the UK position 
was that the bonus cap imposed harmonized limits on pay and thus 
went beyond the limits of Article 53(1) TFEU (the competence 
deployed) which supports the freedom of establishment); and failures 
with respect to impact assessment and consultation. Following an 
opinion from the Court’s Advocate General, which did not support 
the UK position, the action was withdrawn. 
The United Kingdom also lost the ESMA case - perhaps the 
most closely followed of this sequence of challenges given its 
implications for the operation of the ESAs87 - in which it argued that 
the market intervention powers granted to ESMA under the Short 
Selling Regulation (including the power to prohibit short selling 
activity by market actors in national markets) breached a number of 
Treaty requirements, including in relation to the Article 114 
competence deployed.88 It was successful, however, in the ECB 
‘location’ case, although the Court’s acceptance of the UK’s 
argument was based on technical grounds, and not on the breach of 
                                                                                                                                  
85.  UK v Council and Parliament, Case C-209/13, 2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CJ0209. The Court of Justice rejected the challenge, 
primarily on grounds related to the premature nature of the action as a financial transaction 
taxation regime had not, at the time of the UK action, been adopted. 
86.  See UK v Parliament and Council, Case C-507/13, 2014, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CC0507.  
87.  See Carl F. Bergstrom, Shaping the New System for Delegation of Powers to EU 
Agencies: United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council (Short Selling), 52 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 219 (2015); Pieter Van Cleynenbrueguel, Meroni Circumvented? Article 114 
TFEU and EU Regulatory Agencies, 21 MAASTRICHT J. OF INT’L L. 64 (2014); Valia Babis, 
The Power to Ban Short-Selling: The Beginning of a New Era for EU Agencies, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No 027/2014 (2014), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2420011; Miroslava Scholten & Marloes van Rijsbergen, The ESMA 
Short Selling Case: Erecting a New Delegation Doctrine in the EU upon the Meroni-Romano 
Remnants, 41 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 389 (2014). 
88.  See UK v Council and Parliament, Case C-270/12, 2014, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0270.   
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the Treaties’ non-discrimination principles which was a key aspect of 
the UK’s argument.89 
While the UK’s scorecard before the Court of Justice is mixed, 
the chilling effect of potential action by the United Kingdom should 
not be discounted as an influence on the development of EU financial 
regulation. In the case of the Short Selling ruling, for example, while 
the United Kingdom failed to have ESMA’s intervention powers 
over-turned, the ruling is likely to have had a moderating effect on 
any incentives, which the ESAs may otherwise have had to test their 
new powers. 
III. INTERNAL EFFECTS: SINGLE MARKET REGULATION 
The UK’s absence is unlikely to lead to a material change to the 
EU’s current posture on financial regulation. This prediction is based 
on the likely dilution of the effects of the UK’s withdrawal by 
institutional factors, as well as on the legacy effects that will likely 
follow the UK’s withdrawal. 
Institutionally, and looked at in historical perspective, the great 
reforming movements in EU financial regulation have not been 
initiated by single Member States or even coalitions of Member 
States. The two most recent reforming periods (the FSAP 1999-2004 
liberalizing era; and the financial crisis 2008-2014 regulatory, risk-
reduction era) were driven by an interlocking array of political but 
also market and institutional/supranational factors, including global 
market conditions (which drove liberalization in the case of the FSAP 
era and regulatory retrenchment over the financial crisis era). 
National preferences remain important. The absence of the 
United Kingdom may mean that the ECOFIN Council will in the 
future more easily adopt a more regulatory and less liberal posture. It 
may also be less concerned to promote market-based funding and 
more comfortable with the bank-based status quo. But the UK’s 
default position has been to react on a piecemeal basis - not to steer 
grand regulatory designs. Its absence is unlikely to have effects that 
are on the scale of Germany’s varying stances on EU financial 
governance more generally.90 The removal of the United Kingdom as 
                                                                                                                                  
89.  See Case UK v European Central Bank (ECB), T-496/11, 2015, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62011TJ0496 (two related challenges 
were subsequently withdrawn). 
90.  On how Germany’s varying degrees of willingness to lead on financial and 
economic governance have shaped EU action, see Magnus G. Schoeller, Providing Political 
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the dominant non-euro-area Member State is also unlikely to have 
significant traction - at least in the short term, and at least in relation 
to regulatory governance. The United Kingdom has consistently 
sought to protect a ‘multi-currency’ form of financial market 
integration and to defend the integrity of the single market. The 
salience of this issue in the United Kingdom is clear from the pre-
referendum political maneuvers in the European Union. Before the 
referendum, UK Prime Minister Cameron won a political 
commitment from the European Council (in the now defunct February 
2016 ‘New Settlement for the UK’91) that euro area institutional 
governance measures would not be imposed on the single market. It 
may be (and is probably likely) that the euro area will continue to 
build bespoke supervisory and (although less likely) risk-sharing 
structures, given the distinct institutional and other incentives in the 
euro area.92 But from a regulatory governance perspective, the single 
rulebook that governs the single market and the euro area is unlikely 
to become a euro area construct, at least in the short term. The 
Council adopts financial regulation measures through a QMV, as 
noted above; there is already a euro area QMV, and the related 
possibility for euro area caucusing and blocking, in place in the 
Council with nineteen of twenty-eight (soon twenty-seven) EU 
Member States in the euro area. Nonetheless, the political economy of 
Council discussions on EU financial regulation, certainly over the 
frenetic crisis-era period, does not suggest that the euro area speaks as 
one voice; coalitions are more likely to be formed on ‘market-
shaping/making’ lines than on single market/euro area lines. In 
addition, different legislative negotiations have seen different 
coalitions form and reform, depending on the distinct issues at stake.93 
Further, all the current policy indications suggest an institutional and 
political commitment to preserve the regulatory integrity of the single 
market. There is, for example, a current concern to strengthen pan-EU 
                                                                                                                                  
Leadership? Three Case Studies on Germany’s Ambiguous Role in the Eurozone Crisis, 24 J. 
OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017). 
91.  Notices from European Union Institutions, Bodies, Offices and Agencies, A New 
Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union, Extract of the conclusions of 
the European Council of 18-19 February 2016, 2016 O.J. C 69 I/3 (Annex I).  
92.  From a political economy perspective, see Frank Schimmelfennig, A Differentiated 
Leap Forward: Spillover, Path-dependency, and Graded Membership in European Banking 
Regulation, 39 WESTERN EUR.POL. 483 (2016). 
93.  On the ECOFIN Council dynamics generally over the crisis reform period, see 
Moloney, supra note 11, at 891-92. 
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regulatory ‘risk reduction’ measures within the single rulebook prior 
to the building of further euro area risk-sharing structures, notably a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme - regarded as the ‘missing pillar’ 
of Banking Union.94 
In addition, institutional factors will dilute any effects from the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom. The ECOFIN Council is a co-
legislator with the European Parliament in the financial regulation 
sphere. The Parliament is now a force to be reckoned with in the 
legislative process, particularly in the ‘trilogue’ negotiations during 
which a compromise is sought between the Commission’s proposal 
for a measure, and the Council and Parliament positions. Since the 
financial crisis era, the Parliament has become an increasingly mature 
and effective legislator and has achieved some notable victories,95 
including in relation to administrative rules, over which it has a veto 
power.96 Its influence can be expected to increase, as is clear from the 
assertive position it is taking on the EU/UK negotiations97 and its 
concern to protect the integrity of EU financial governance 
arrangements.98 Similarly, the Commission99 and the ECB,100 who 
                                                                                                                                  
94.  See ECOFIN Council, Progress Report on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
and Banking Union Roadmap, Council Document 14841/16 (Nov. 25, 2016). 
95.  See Moloney, supra note 11, at 893-94. See generally M. O’Keeffe, M. Salines & 
M. Wieczorek, The European Parliament’s Strategy in EU Economic and Financial Reform 
23 J. OF EUR.PUB. POL’Y 217 (2016). 
96.  The Parliament deployed its veto power in relation to financial administrative rules 
(which are adopted by the Commission and either proposed or advised on by the ESAs) for the 
first time in 2016, rejecting a package of administrative rules relating to disclosure 
requirements for packaged investment products and signaling its commitment to protecting its 
prerogatives in relation to administrative governance. See European Parliament, Objection to a 
delegated act: Key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment 
products, P8_TA(2016)0347 (Sept. 14, 2016).   
97.  The European Parliament has a veto power over the EU/UK Article 50 agreements 
and has made clear its intention to influence the negotiations. See European Parliament, 
Motion for a Resolution to wind up the debate on negotiations with the United Kingdom 
following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union, (Mar. 29, 2017) 
(B8-0237/2017). 
98.  The ECON committee, for example, held, prior to the UK’s official notification of 
withdrawal, an ‘exchange of views’ with the Commission and the ESAs on how access 
arrangements might be configured under the current third country rules. See UK Parliament, 
House of Commons, Brussels Bulletin No. 533 (Mar. 10, 2017). 
99.  Although the extent to which the Commission’s influence has increased is 
contested. See generally Michael W. Bauer & Stefan Becker, The Unelected Winner of the 
Crisis: the European Commission’s Strengthened Role in Economic Governance, 36 J. OF 
EUR. INTEGRATION 213 (2014). 
100.  See generally Zdenek Kudrna, Financial Market Regulation: Crisis-induced 
Supranationality, 38 J. OF EUR. INTEGRATION 251 (2016). 
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played a large part in the development of the crisis-era reforms, can 
be expected to seek to increase their influence over EU financial 
regulation. 
Further, there is little sign in the current policy agenda - which is 
primarily directed to finessing the crisis era reforms, completing 
Banking Union, and achieving Capital Market Union - of institutional 
appetite for major change to EU regulatory governance. All the 
indications suggest a concern to bed in and finesse the current 
regulatory regime.101 Institutional energies can be expected to focus 
on managing the costs of and calibrating the current regime in 
response to market developments.102 In addition, any appetite for 
radical reforms in relation to which the absence of the United 
Kingdom could matter will be moderated by geo-political conditions. 
The European Union can be expected to be wary of imposing onerous 
new requirements on its financial sector given current indications of 
large-scale deregulation in the United States and potential competitive 
disadvantage to the European Union.103 
The UK’s absence is also likely to be diluted by legacy effects. 
Strong empirical evidence has recently emerged of the embedding of 
an EU commitment to proportionality and differentiation. 
Proportionality assessments are already a feature of the single 
rulebook. The sharply contested remuneration requirements which 
apply to banks under the Capital Requirements Directive IV, for 
example, are to apply ‘in a manner and to the extent that is 
appropriate to [relevant firms’] size, internal organisation and the 
nature, scope, and complexity of their activities’ (Article 92(2)). 
                                                                                                                                  
101.  Recent illustrations include the Commission’s November 2016 ‘stock-take’ reform 
agenda and the Council’s focus on ‘completing Banking Union.’ See Council Conclusions on a 
roadmap to complete the Banking Union, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Press Release 
353/16 (June 17, 2016), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/06/17-conclusions-on-banking-union/.  
102.  The Commission’s current review of the prudential regime which applies to 
investment firms under CRD IV/CRR, for example, is designed to ‘evaluate, recalibrate and 
simplify’ existing EU rules. See European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment, Review 
of the appropriate prudential treatment for investment firms (Mar. 22, 2017), at 2. 
103.  An Executive Order of February 3, 2017 sets out core principles for regulating the 
US financial system, which include that regulation be efficient, effective, and appropriately 
tailored, and calls on all relevant agencies to report on the extent to which current laws and 
international obligations promote and support the core principles. President Trump has singled 
out the Dodd Frank Act for reform stating, in the context of the Order, that cuts to Dodd Frank 
could be expected. See Barney Jopson and Ben McLannahan, Trump prepares to take axe to 
Wall St Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1c5a8dd0-ea3a-
11e6-967b-c88452263daf.  
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Proportionality requirements are, however, becoming increasingly 
important. The Commission’s recent November 2016 report on the 
‘stock-take,’ which it has undertaken of EU financial regulation, 
suggests a strong institutional commitment to the proportionality 
principle as a means for moderating the costs of regulation and for 
engaging with different market actors and segments. A recurring 
theme of the Commission’s related reform agenda is the need for EU 
measures to be more proportionate and to reflect the distinct risks 
posed by different financial system actors.104 Similar themes emerge 
from the important November 2016 package of reforms, which the 
Commission has proposed to the EU’s banking rulebook and which 
will shape the banking reform agenda for some time.105 The European 
Parliament’s 2016 Balz Resolution on the Commission’s ‘stock-take’ 
has similarly underlined that EU financial legislation should be 
proportionate, and highlighted a number of areas where it had 
disproportionate effects.106 While the United Kingdom can be 
expected to have championed the cause of proportionality, recent 
evidence suggests considerable support within the EU institutions for 
an appropriately proportionate application of rules. This may 
significantly mitigate the effects of the UK’s departure. 
It can be predicted relatively safely, however, that EU financial 
regulation, however proportionate in design, will continue to bend 
towards uniformity. The Commission’s November 2016 ‘stock-take’ 
reform agenda repeatedly references the need to strengthen the single 
rulebook.107 The ECB is emerging as a standard bearer for greater 
harmonization, driving the removal of ‘national options and 
discretions’ from the banking rulebook within the Banking Union 
zone.108 The current Capital Markets Union regulatory reform agenda 
                                                                                                                                  
104.  See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working 
Document on the Call for Evidence, SWD (16) 359 Final, at 29-36 (Nov. 2016) (calling for the 
proportionate application of rules to be enhanced on a cross-sector basis).   
105.  For summarization, see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS: CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (CRR/CRD IV) AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
(BRRD/SRM) AMENDMENTS, MEMO/16/3840 (2016).   
106.  See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, STOCKTAKING AND CHALLENGES OF EU 
FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION, P8_TA(2015)0268 (2016).    
107.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
108.  See Regulation 2016/445/EU of the European Central Bank on the exercise of 
options and discretions available in Union law (ECB/2016/4), 2016 O.J. L 78/60; EUROPEAN 
CENTRAL BANK, BANKING SUPERVISION, ECB GUIDE ON OPTIONS AND DISCRETIONS 
AVAILABLE IN UNION LAW (2016), https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/
ecb_guide_options_discretions.en.pdf.  
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is in part designed to deliver greater harmonization, including in 
relation to areas of national law, which have not been subject to EU 
harmonization given their embedding in national private and 
procedural law, in particular insolvency law.109 In the absence of the 
United Kingdom and its support for national discretion, more, and not 
less, harmonization can be expected. 
IV. EXTERNAL EFFECTS: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
There are several dimensions to how the European Union 
engages with the international financial market, chief among the 
regulatory dimension (the process through which international 
standards are adopted and subsequently implemented by the European 
Union); and the access dimension (the EU rules which govern the 
extent to which and how third country actors can access the EU 
financial system). Both these dimensions may be influenced by the 
UK’s withdrawal, but here again the extent of the effects may be 
limited. 
The European Union has always engaged with the process 
through which standards are set for the international financial system, 
but since the financial crisis it has become a significant player in 
global financial governance, capable of imposing its preferences 
through multiple channels, whether political or technocratic.110 These 
channels include its participation in the major international standard-
setting bodies of international financial governance, such the Basel 
Committee, the Financial Stability Board, and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, through the Commission, 
the ECB, and, increasingly frequently, the ESAs – and alongside the 
Member States and their regulator representatives, which sit 
independently on these bodies (including the United Kingdom). 111 
The influence of international financial governance on EU financial 
regulation, and the now considerable ability of the European Union to 
impose its preferences on international standards, are unlikely to be 
                                                                                                                                  
109.  Action Plan, supra note 23, at 6, 23-25.   
110.  For an examination of how the different preferences which shape international 
financial governance are formed and diffused and how ‘power’ is gathered and deployed, see 
LUCIA QUAGLIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION & GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 8-17 (2014).  
111.  See generally Niamh Moloney, International Financial Governance, the EU, and 
Brexit: The Agencification of EU Financial Governance and the Implications, 17 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 451 (2016). 
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changed by the absence of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union; these two factors will also moderate the regulatory governance 
effects of UK withdrawal. 
Particularly since the financial crisis era, EU financial regulation 
has been shaped by the international standard setting bodies, and it 
will continue to be so. At Commission level, the November 2016 
banking package reforms, for example, are in part designed to 
implement Financial Stability Board standards in relation to ‘TLAC’ 
– the ‘total loss absorbing capacity’ tool for supporting bank 
resolution – and to address how TLAC interacts with the parallel EU 
loss absorbency tool (the ‘MREL’ – or minimum requirement for 
eligible liabilities). At ECOFIN level, ECOFIN is monitoring a range 
of international governance developments, including the Financial 
Stability Board’s initiatives in relation to misconduct.112  
Any new standards adopted at the international level will be 
shaped by EU preferences, alongside the distinct preferences of its 
Member States where they sit independently on the relevant bodies. 
The European Union may, however, find it easier to come to a 
common position on international negotiations in the absence of the 
United Kingdom and in the coalitions and structures through which 
the European Union imposes its preferences – such as EBA and 
Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism on the Basel 
Committee.113 
During the subsequent implementation process, international 
standards will continue to be ‘carved out’ from by the European 
Union to reflect EU and Member State preferences, as was the case 
with the Basel III agreement. The EU’s implementation of Basel III 
through the Capital Requirements Directive IV/Capital Requirements 
Regulation, and the related imposition of EU interests, particularly in 
relation to facilitating EU bank lending to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (the European Union imposed lower capital requirements 
on SME lending), led to a finding of ‘material non-compliance’ from 
the Basel Committee in its 2014 review of EU compliance with the 
                                                                                                                                  
112.  See Financial Stability Board, Presidency Progress Report on EDIS and the 
Banking Union Roadmap, Council Document 14841/16 (Nov. 25, 2016).  
113.  For an account of the SSM’s activities on the Basel Committee, see European 
Central Bank, Banking Supervision, Annual Report on supervisory activities 2016 (Mar. 
2017), at 46-47, available at http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/ssmar2016en.pdf.   
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regime.114 Further carve-outs can be expected. The European Union 
is, for example, currently resisting the finalization of the most recent 
suite of Basel proposals (informally termed ‘Basel IV’), concerned as 
to their impact on the competitive position of the EU banking 
sector.115 It is not clear that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
will lead to material change in relation to carve-outs. The extent to 
which the European Union carves out from international standards is 
a function of a range of different national and other interests and has 
not usually been dictated by the United Kingdom. For example, the 
EU’s famous IAS 39 carve-out from what are now International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was driven by France’s concern 
to protect its national banking sector.116 Similarly, a range of different 
national interests, and different banking systems, drove the EU’s 
approach to the implementation of the Basel III accord.117 The United 
Kingdom has traditionally been a supporter of compliance with 
international standards and is continuing to emphasize the importance 
of such compliance in its final months as a member of the European 
Union. It is, for example, concerned to ensure that the Commission’s 
current proposal for a harmonized regime governing CCP resolution 
remains consistent with international standards and G20 reform 
commitments.118 It may be that in the absence of the United Kingdom 
the Council will more easily support carve-outs from international 
standards. But overall, the influence of international financial 
governance on EU regulatory governance, and the ability of the 
European Union to impose its preferences and its approach to carve-
                                                                                                                                  
114.  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Regulatory Consistency 
Assessment Programme (RCAP), Assessment of Basel III regulations – European Union (Dec. 
2014), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d300.pdf.  
115.  See Caroline Binham & Emma Dunkley, Basel postpones bank reform vote amid 
policy differences, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), . https://www.ft.com/content/589f1ce0-d1a1-
11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51. Both the European Parliament (European Parliament, European 
Parliament Resolution on Finalisation of Basel III, P8_TA-PROV(2016)0439 (Nov. 23, 2016)) 
and the Council (Council conclusions on finalizing the post crisis Basel reforms, COUNCIL OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, Press Release 432/2016 (July 12, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/7/47244644169_en.pdf) have expressed concern and called for the 
Basel reforms to be calibrated and to reflect the different distribution of their impact on 
banking systems globally. 
116.  See generally further Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Dependence despite 
Independence, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV 275 (2008). 
117.  See David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, The Comparative Political Economy of 
Basel III in Europe, 35 POL’Y AND SOC’Y 205 (2016). 
118.  See HM Treasury, Explanatory Memorandum for European Legislation and 
Documents (Dec. 14, 2016).  
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outs, are not likely to be materially changed by the UK’s withdrawal 
from the European Union. 
The European Union also engages with the international market 
by bending third country regimes to EU regulation.119 It does this by 
means of the ‘equivalence’ rules, which govern access to the EU 
market (a third country actor can alternatively establish a subsidiary 
in the European Union, in which case that subsidiary is treated as an 
EU actor and benefits from EU law rights). These third country rules 
(which are not available for all financial market segments) typically 
link market access to the ‘equivalence’ of the third country regime 
with the EU regime and (not always) require registration in the 
European Union, usually with ESMA, the EU’s securities markets 
authority. The MiFID II/MiFIR regime, for example, provides for an 
equivalence-based access route for firms providing wholesale 
investment services into the European Union on a cross-border 
services basis, based on ESMA registration. Similarly, the credit 
rating agency regime links third country access to an equivalence 
process and ESMA registration, as does the regime governing CCPs. 
By contrast, the banking rulebook (CRD IV/CRR) does not provide 
specific access rights for third country firms.120 Other equivalence 
rules have an internal focus. They usually either moderate the 
requirements which apply to transactions between EU counterparties 
and third country counterparties, or restrict the nature of the third 
country transactions in which an EU actor can engage.121 
The United Kingdom has long been a strong supporter of the 
European Union adopting an open and liberal posture to 
access/equivalence in related ECOFIN negotiations.122 It was, for 
example, influential during the Council negotiations on the MiFID 
                                                                                                                                  
119.  On the different strategies which the European Union deploys to exert influence 
internationally, see generally Abraham Newman & Elliot Posner, Putting the EU in its Place: 
Policy Strategies and the Global Regulatory Context, 22 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1316 (2015). 
120.  For an industry-oriented review of the different equivalence/access regimes, see 
Brexit and Equivalence: Review of the Financial Services Framework Across All Sectors, 
SHEARMAN & STERLING (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/
publications/2016/08/brexit-and-equivalence-review-of-the-financial.  
121.  For example, higher capital requirements apply where loan assets of EU banks are 
located in a jurisdiction which has not been determined to be ‘equivalent,’ while EU 
investment firms are prohibited in some circumstances from entering into transactions on 
trading venues in third countries whose regulatory regimes have not been declared to be 
equivalent. See generally Moloney, supra note 3.  
122.  See generally Lucia Quaglia, The Politics of ‘Third Country Equivalence’ in Post 
Crisis Financial Services Regulation in the European Union, 38 WEST EUR. POL.167 (2015). 
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II/MiFIR market access regime, and supported a more liberal 
approach to access to the EU investment fund market under the 2011 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, although that 
regime remains complex. The future of the third country regime is 
highly uncertain at present.123 But this uncertainty is not only, or even 
primarily, a function of the future absence of the UK’s voice in 
ECOFIN. It is mainly a function of whether the European Union will 
change its approach to third country access more fundamentally as 
part of its response to the UK withdrawal and to any stability or 
efficiency risks the EU financial market may consequently face. The 
United Kingdom is seeking bespoke financial services access 
arrangements, to be included in a Free Trade Agreement, as was 
confirmed in the Prime Minister’s March 29, 2017 Article 50 letter. In 
parallel, however, the European Union is contemplating revisions to 
its third country regime more generally.124 Current indications suggest 
a concern to exert more control over third country actors operating in 
the European Union, including through enhanced supervision 
arrangements.125 It remains to be seen how the EU’s third country 
arrangements will develop. It is reasonable to suggest that the 
European Union will wish to signal its openness to global financial 
markets in the wake of the UK’s withdrawal. It may, for example, 
decide to adopt a more coherent approach to access/equivalence, 
which replaces the current patchwork of third country arrangements, 
and to adopt a more liberal posture. Current indications suggest that it 
may deploy the proportionality principle more fully, applying a more 
intensive review of equivalence where market access is sought from a 
third country with systemic implications for the European Union, and 
a less intrusive review for third countries with smaller and less 
systemic markets.126 It is unlikely, however, that the European Union 
will turn inwards at a moment when it will likely seek to signal the 
resilience and depth of its financial market. 
One significant uncertainty attends the EU’s future regulatory 
approach to the international market access. Third countries may 
come to be affected by new regulatory ‘location’ requirements (or 
                                                                                                                                  
123.  For analysis, see generally Armour, supra note 3, Moloney, supra note 3, and 
Ferran, supra note 3. 
124.  See Alex Barker & Jim Brunsden, EU Review Casts Doubt on City’s Hopes for 
‘Equivalence’ as Brexit Last Resort, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 2016).   
125.  See Commission of the European Communities, EU Equivalence Decisions in 
Financial Services Policy: An Assessment, SWD (17) 102 Final.  
126.  See id. 
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requirements that certain activities and/or transactions be located 
within the EU/euro area and subject to EU/euro area supervision 
and/or emergency liquidity/fiscal support). The dominance of the 
United Kingdom as the EU centre for the trading and clearing of euro-
denominated instruments127 has been a source of contention for some 
time, as is clear from the UK’s successful challenge to the ECB’s 
2011 ‘location policy’ for euro-denominated derivatives clearing;128 
this policy required that related clearing infrastructures be legally 
incorporated within the euro area (with managerial and operational 
control exercised within the euro area) and, accordingly, subject to the 
oversight of the ECB-located Eurosystem oversight of payment, 
clearing, and settlement systems and so eligible for ECB liquidity 
support.129 In the wake of the ruling, the Bank of England (which 
supervises UK CCPs) and the ECB came to an agreement on 
supervisory coordination, information sharing, and liquidity support, 
which acknowledged the distinct financial stability interest of the 
ECB in UK CCPs which cleared significant volumes of euro-
denominated instruments.130 But the imminent withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union has heightened tensions. 
Recent indications from the ECB suggest a concern to re-establish 
this policy.131 Certain Member States, including France, also support 
                                                                                                                                  
127.  The fate of UK-based euro-denominated derivatives clearing has been a major 
feature of the Brexit policy debate given the importance of this industry to the UK financial 
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128.  Case UK v European Central Bank (ECB), T-496/11, 2015, http://eur-
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131.  ECB President Draghi has been reported as calling for ECB oversight of post 
Brexit, UK-located clearing business. See J Brunsden, ECB Steps Up Warning on UK-based 
Euro Clearing after Brexit, FIN. TIMES (Jan 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/51a68c6e-
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repatriating euro-denominated clearing to the euro area.132 Some 
clarity was brought in June 2017 when the Commission presented a 
proposal for the supervision of third country CCPs; the proposal is 
less radical than might have been expected, adopting a staggered 
approach, only deploying a relocation requirement for the most 
systemically important CCPs, and making any such requirement 
dependent on a prior assessment of systemic importance.133 At the 
time of writing, the fate of the proposal, which must be agreed by the 
European Parliament and Council, is difficult to predict. The interests 
and preferences swirling around the euro clearing controversy are 
many; location requirements serve an array of interests from the 
securing of competitive advantage to the protection of financial 
stability. The Commission’s proposal is, however, nuanced, and does 
not imply immediate relocation, which may moderate the risk of any 
global regulatory retaliation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
EU financial regulation has been shaped by a multiplicity of 
interests and preferences, of which UK interests form just one 
component. The United Kingdom has nonetheless left a distinct 
imprint on EU financial regulation. It can be credited with ensuring 
the regime is differentiated, to at least some degree, to different 
market segments; is responsive to the distinct risk profiles of the 
sophisticated wholesale markets; leaves some room for national 
experimentation and for the accommodation of distinct national 
markets and conditions; embeds the proportionality principle; and is 
technically robust. The United Kingdom cannot, however, be credited 
with the overall design and architecture of EU financial regulation, 
which has been shaped by multiple internal and external interests and 
preferences. 
It is axiomatic that it remains to be seen how EU financial 
regulation will develop without the United Kingdom. It can be 
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expected to become ever-more standardized and to bend more sharply 
towards uniformity. It may also become more prescriptive and less 
liberal in design, although international market dynamics are likely to 
ensure that the European Union will strive to remain competitive. The 
current direction of travel in regulatory policy suggests that radical 
changes to current regulatory designs and priorities are unlikely, not 
least given the influence of international financial governance and the 
international standard setters on EU financial regulation. The most 
uncertainty attaches to the EU’s third country arrangements for access 
to the EU market. But even here, international geo-politics and trade 
relations are likely to have more traction than the absence of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union. 
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